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1. Introduction: recession of ‘nineties’ vs. the boom of ‘noughties’. 
The first years of Post-Soviet transformation in Russia, which coincided with 
the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, were by most accounts, a period of economic 
chaos at the brink of failure which resulted in the collapse of Russian ruble in 
19981. 
According to calculations of the Economist Intelligence Unit, within seven 
years after the beginning of economic transition Russia lost almost 30% of its real 
gross domestic product (hereafter GDP), which is comparable to the decline in the 
economy of the United States during the Great Depression2. The appalling rates of 
consumer price inflation peaked at 2,500%3depreciated the savings of households 
and despite the fact that some preferred hard assets and foreign currency as a 
storage of value most Russian citizens lost their savings. The collapse of the 
purchasing power of ruble led to its devaluation on the 1 January 1998.  
Ineffective management, breaking down of old trading connections and the 
eventual implementation of hard budget constraint led to a number of enterprises 
going bankrupt. Between 1991 and 1998 the average level of industrial production 
across the country fell by almost 52%4. Privatised enterprises effectively managed 
by the new class of educated entrepreneurs adapted to the market conditions by 
improving efficiency and cost reduction. These industrial and corporate changes 
resulted in the rising long-term rate of unemployment which had its peak of 
25.7% in 19935.  
The level of foreign direct investment (hereafter FDI) was one of the lowest 
among other economies in transition. In 1995 for instance, Russia attracted only 
$345million of inward FDI stocks while the outflow of capital was $20.1 billion6. 
Even though the country maintained positive trading balance since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union it was low (the lowest in 1997 at $19.7 billion)7 taking into 
account the size of the economy and the vast amount of tradable natural resources.  
Those on the lowest incomes, including pensioners, teachers and families on 
state benefits are always amongst the most vulnerable to economic recessions, and 
face the highest risk of falling into poverty trap8. Even though, the level of those 
                                                 
1Desai, p.49 
2Copper, p.2 
3Rosstat, available at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/prices/potr/2009/I-ipc.htm. Links to 
Rosstat, OECD and all other websites were last accessed on 22 April 2011 and none were reported 
to be broken as at that date.  
4Rosstat, available at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/business/prom/ind_prom_okved.xls 
5OECD, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/825635733410 
6Ibid, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/824532554644 
7Ibid, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/824347818584 
8Bronson et al, p.225 
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who fell below the poverty line9 dropped initially at the onset of the reforms from 
33.5% in 1992 to 22.4% in 1994, it remained stagnant for the next four years and 
started to increase in 1998 reaching 29% in 2000. From the government’s point of 
view, having such a large proportion of the least economically favoured people 
means a potential threat in the elections. It is therefore understandable why 
reformist Boris Yeltsin only marginally defeated the Communist Party of Russia 
leader Gennady Zyuganov in 1996 Presidential Election, the outcome of which 
had to be found out in the second round of voting10.  
On December 31st of 1999 Yeltsin stepped down as a President of Russia and 
the then Prime-Minister Vladimir Putin temporarily took charge as the head of the 
country, later becoming the legitimate President after the election in 200011.  
Elections of the new leader of Russia at the verge of the New Millennium were 
associated with hope for economic stability, growth and prosperity of the people 
who have long enough suffered from economic volatility, financial instability 
following the crisis of 1998 and most importantly, uncertainty about the direction 
which the country was heading. The dark page of the ‘nineties’ was turned over 
and to begin a new era of economic discipline imposed by the rule of Vladimir 
Putinin the ‘noughties’.  
Indeed, the country has since demonstrated strong economic performance and 
delivered good results. Good enough for Russia to be considered one of the 
countries to ‘build better global economy’ along with India, China and Brazil. 
Consumer inflation rate dropped from 20.2% in 2000 to 13.3% in 200812, which 
was still high, but indicated a significant improvement, while the unemployment 
decreased from 10.6% to 6.3%13. The volume of international trade (measured in 
sum of total exports and imports) increased by a factor of 5.38 in US dollar 
terms14 during the same time span15, while most of the industries showed 
significant improvements in labour productivity in the same period of time16. 
These are just a few of all economic indicators that led to Russian real GDP 
                                                 
9Defined here as the share of population living on income below the minimum subsistence level 
set by the government of Russian Federation. 
10Central Election Commission of Russia (hereafter CIKRF), available 
athttp://www.cikrf.ru/banners/vib_arhiv/president/1996/index.html 
11CIKRF, available at http://www.cikrf.ru/banners/vib_arhiv/president/2000/index.html 
12
 Rosstat, available at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/prices/potr/2010/I-ipc.htm 
13Ibid, available at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/trud/trud6.xls 
14Ibid, available at 
http://bi.gks.ru:8080/DDB/showcharts.jsp?report=voexim&project=BIPortal2.bip&width=1250 
15Kowitt.  
16
 Rosstat, available at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/vvp/pr-tru.xls 
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growing at an annual average rate of almost 7%17 between 2000 and 2008. This is 
a rate at which the size of the economy doubles every 10 years18. 
At first glance this creates such a strong positive impression of Russian 
performance, that one may be tempted to call it economic miracle. However, these 
impressive facts and figures do not necessary represent either the standard of 
living or the level of economic deprivation along with other indicators of people’s 
welfare. Building on Jeremy Bentham’s idea that the ultimate goal of economic 
policy should be to maximise social welfare19, one may find it useful to judge the 
economic performance not just on the abstract figures indicating the quantitative 
level of growth, but rather on how this growth has (if) increased the quality of 
social well-being. This can be a rather complicated process and stretch to the point 
of studies on happiness economics20, however, the most easily understandable and 
perhaps the most fundamental of welfare indicators is the concept of poverty, on 
which this work is concentrated. 
The aim of this paper is to describe and assess the level of poverty per se along 
with a few other social indicators in Russia for the period between 2000 and 2008 
and to understand how significant was the effect of spectacular economic 
performance Russia enjoyed in that period. There are several other reasons behind 
the specific time frame chosen for this research. First, it coincides with the 
Presidency of Vladimir Putin and one can evaluate social policy of ‘Putin’s era’ 
using this research. Secondly, figures for 2009 may not be good indicators 
because of the effects of exogenous factors (global economic crisis) occurring in 
that year and may contribute to wrong conclusions. Finally, most of the data used 
comes from the Russian Federal Service of State Statistics (hereafter Rosstat) 
which at the time this paper is written does not have some recent necessary data.  
Section 2 of this paper will provide various definitions of poverty and 
approaches to its measurement. We21 will then try to build a poverty profile in 
Russia by outlining findings by several scholars in Section 3. In Section 4 we will 
attempt to find relationships between poverty, inequality and economic growth 
found by various scholars. Based on those results in the same section we will 
outline our hypotheses to be tested. Section 5 will describe our approach to 
hypotheses testing, while Section 6 will provide empirical results. We will finish 
with a summary of key findings followed by a brief discussion and concluding 
remarks in Section 7. 
 
                                                 
17Rosstat, available at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/vvp/tab3.xls 
18“Rule of 72”: 72/7=10 years app. 
19Frey and Stutzer, p.2 
20As described by Frey and Stutzer, and Easterlin  
21Hereafter ‘we’ will refer to the author. 
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2. Poverty: definitions and approaches. 
Poverty is often divided into relative poverty – a condition of having fewer 
resources than others in a society, and absolute poverty22, which has numerous 
definitions by scholars from various institutions and non-governmental 
organizations (hereafter NGOs). World Bank, for instance, defines poverty as 
‘...pronounced deprivation in well-being, comprising many dimensions. It 
includes low incomes and the inability to acquire the basic goods and services 
necessary for survival with dignity. Poverty also encompasses low levels of health 
and education, poor access to clean water and sanitation, inadequate physical 
security, lack of voice, and insufficient capacity and opportunity to better one’s 
life’23. A definition by the United Nations encompasses the same core 
characteristics also adding susceptibility to violence as another feature24, while 
Amartya Sen outlines the most basic capabilities essential to attaining a good 
enough standard of living not to be deemed ‘poor’: ‘e.g., to meet nutritional 
requirements, to escape avoidable disease, to be sheltered, to be clothed, to be 
able to travel, and to be educated’25.Such broad definitions leave us with difficulty 
and ambiguity in measuring the level of poverty. 
According to Martin Ravallion26, poverty measurement assumes the existence 
of pre-determined and well-defined standards of consumption – called ‘poverty 
lines’, which act as a certain threshold that must be reached in order to avoid 
falling under poverty qualification. These lines, therefore, represent a minimum 
level of ‘acceptable’ economic participation27.  The composition and structure of 
poverty lines vary according to the economic policies of a given country. For 
example, poverty line in the United States is a minimum-budget estimate for food 
requirement multiplied by a factor of three, while poverty lines in India have 
traditionally been based on the estimates of expenditure necessary to acquire a 
minimum consumption of calories28. Rosstat does not provide a definition of 
poverty; neither does it have the official poverty measurement. What it has on the 
other hand, is the data for the share of people whose income falls below the 
minimum subsistence level (i.e. living wage). The Federal Law of Russian 
Federation defines minimum subsistence level as the price of the basket of 
consumer goods, which consists of minimum amounts of food, non-food goods 
and services necessary for preservation of health and survival, and additional 
                                                 
22Hereafter ‘poverty’ will refer to absolute poverty. 
23World Bank, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/0,,contentMDK:22569
747~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:336992,00.html 
24Gordon, p.3 
25Sen, p.162-163 
26Ravallion, ‘Poverty Comparisons…’, p.25 
27Ray, p.250 
28Ibid 
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compulsory fees and charges29. Therefore, according to the definitions presented 
above, the use of the minimum subsistence level as the basis for poverty line is 
justified.  
United Nations (hereafter the UN) has other additional applied methods of 
measuring poverty than just national poverty line. They see the proportion of 
people with incomes less than the minimum subsistence level as a criterion for 
general poverty, while the proportion of people with incomes less than 50% of the 
minimum subsistence level is defined as a criterion for extreme poverty30. The 
progress in achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals (hereafter MDGs) 
in fighting poverty is measured by the proportion of people living on less than 
$131 and $2.1532 a day. In addition to that, proportions of undernourished families 
among all families with children and undernourished people in general are also 
among the indicators MDG progress in fighting poverty.  
Foster, Greer and Thorbecke33(hereafter FGT) derived a formula to measure 
the level of poverty which possesses a number of useful properties and combines 
information on the extent and intensity of poverty as well as the inequality among 
the poor. The FGT index is a popular tool in building the poverty profile since it is 
decomposable with population-share weights. It also allows assessing the 
effectiveness of government social policy by measuring, for instance, the progress 
made in helping groups with a high poverty risk in escaping poverty34.  
There are many other widespread methods of measuring and estimating 
poverty levels, each with its features and limitations, such as a Sen Index35. 
Those, however, will not be used in this paper. It is also essential to add that some 
of the characteristics of the poor are not accounted for many estimations and 
indices. Most are concerned with the actual survival requirements, such as having 
enough food and water, but none of those outlined above account for other 
essential requirements of the poor, like housing, for example. It can be argued, 
that poverty should not be measured and viewed just as the share of people with 
incomes lower than certain threshold, but rather a holistic approach should be 
taken. In this sense poverty can be assessed from the point of view of Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs, where fulfilling physiological needs is just a first step on the 
way out of poverty, but a complete way out of poverty also goes through 
realisation of safety, psychological, esteem and self-actualization needs36. 
According to the indices described above, a person, who has enough income to 
                                                 
29Rosstat, available at http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_14p/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/05-31.htm 
30National Human Development Report in the Russian Federation 2010 (hereafter UNDP), p.25 
31US dollars converted into rubles at purchasing power parity 
32US dollars converted into rubles at purchasing power parity 
33Foster et al, p.763 
34Kuznetcov and Nivorozhkina, p.233 
35Shorrocks, pp.1225-1226 
36Magnuson, ‘Development to Fulfill Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs.’ 
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feed himself and acquire basic goods and services, is not poor even if this person 
has nowhere to live or cannot get good medical treatment simply because this 
parameters are not accounted for in the basic poverty models. By looking at the 
minimum subsistence level of 7,406 rubles37set for Moscow in 2009 and 
comparing it to the housing rental rates in the same region it becomes clear, that 
most of the living wage would be spent on renting one of the cheapest rooms in a 
relatively low quality apartment38. Indeed, the structure of the minimum 
subsistence level does not include any costs of housing; neither does it include the 
costs of expensive medicines that many pensioners may require. Therefore, one 
should understand the limitations of any official estimations of poverty levels and 
do not treat them as the actual share of people in need. However, changes in those 
levels may on the other hand indicate progress made in fighting poverty. 
This paper will be assessing such progress by the methods outlined above: 
Rosstat data on the share of people living on incomes below the minimum 
subsistence level, MDG implementation progress and FGT index. In addition, 
some housing, healthcare and education indicators will also be analysed briefly in 
order to try to produce the real picture of the changing well-being of Russian 
citizens.  
3. Russian poverty: building a profile. 
This section will provide a brief overview of poverty profile and a progress 
made in the fight against it in Russia as seen by different scholars using different 
approaches and measurement techniques outlined in the previous section.  
The UN National Human Development Report 2010 (UNDP hereafter) 
analyses general welfare trends in Russia between 2000 and 2008 and the impact 
of policy measures designed to fight extreme poverty using Rosstat data. The 
trends of poverty indicators are presented in Table 1. It should be noted, however, 
that official statistics do not monitor extreme poverty and estimations presented in 
this table are based on Q3 Household Budget Survey (HBS hereafter) which 
excludes homeless families or people without fixed address. This leaves the most 
vulnerable group of population out of this dataset and, therefore, the true scale of 
extreme poverty phenomena in Russia are not known39.  
There is evidence of progress made in achieving MDGs outlined in Section 2 
of this work. The proportion of people living in extreme poverty on less than $1 a 
day (at PPP) dropped from 1.1% in 2000 to 0.04% in 2008, while the share of 
those living on less than $2.15 decreased from 8.3% to 1.4% in the corresponding 
years. However, considering that one way ticket in Moscow Underground 
                                                 
37
 Rosstat, available athttp://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_14p/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/05-10.htm 
38Rental prices are available at http://a-realt.ru/rent_flat/orders/search/zones/0/0/30 
39UNDP, p.29 
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(Metro), for example, costs about $14041, the adequacy of extreme poverty lines 
set at $2.15 and $1 a day at PPP is questionable to say the least.  Therefore, one 
may argue that national extreme poverty line set at half of the minimum 
subsistence level is more applicable for indicating a more realistic extent of 
poverty. The share of population living on incomes falling under that line 
decreased by a factor of four from 16.7% in 2000 to 4.2% in 2008. This means 
that the extreme form of poverty was mostly eradicated in the analysed period42.  
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Proportion of people living on less 
than, $1 a day (% of the population) 
1.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.04 
Development of the segment living on 
less than $1 a day, 2000=100% 
100 63 15 2 23 20 7 8 4 
Proportion of people living on less 
than $2.15 a day, (% of the 
population) 
8.3 5.6 3.6 2.7 2.5 2.1 1.1 0.4 1.4 
Development of the segment living on 
less than $2.15 a day, 2000=100% 
100 67.6 43.0 32.8 30.5 25.5 13.0 5.3 17.1 
Proportion of people with incomes less 
than 50% of the minimum subsistence 
level, (% of the population) 
16.7 14.0 11.5 10.1 9.3 9.7 6.1 4.2 4.2 
Development of the segment with 
incomes less than 50% of the 
minimum subsistence level, 
2000=100% 
100 83.9 68.8 60.2 55.5 58.1 36.3 24.9 25.0 
Table 1. Development of general and national indicators of extreme poverty, selective HBS 
data, Q3. 
Source:UNDP 
 
As was mentioned in Section 2, the national poverty line in Russia is set to 
equal the minimum subsistence level. Figure 1 below outlines the trend in poverty 
reduction based on this criterion and on poverty gap basis. The share of the 
population with incomes below the minimum subsistence level halved between 
2000 and 2008. Importantly, there is evidence of steady reduction year on year 
indicating there is a trend and the estimations are not erratic throughout. Poverty 
                                                 
40Moscow Underground fares are available at 
http://old.mosmetro.ru/pages/page_0.php?id_page=87 
41As of 22.04.2011 $1=27.94 rubles, Central Bank of Russian Federation, available at 
http://www.cbr.ru/ 
42UNDP, p.30 
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gap, defined as the average shortfall of the total population from poverty line, 
narrowed from 5.0% in 2000 to 1.2% in 2008.  
Overall, without getting into details of the National Poverty Reduction Strategy 
and certain aspects of poverty profile in Russia, the picture drawn by UNDP 
presents evidence of general pattern for poverty reduction in Russia. 
   
Figure 1: Poverty rate and depth in Russia in 2000-2008.  
Source: UNDP                    
 
In addition to the official figures on the level and extent of poverty, Kuznetcov 
and Nivorozhkina43provide their own estimations using Russia Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS hereafter) with household being the object of their 
study. The period and properties they examined only partly coincide with those of 
our interest, but nevertheless, there are some important aspects that should be 
outlined.  
Using FGT indices they estimate the proportion of population in poverty (α=0) 
and average shortfall of per capita disposable income from the poverty line, i.e. 
poverty gap (α=1). The results outlined in Figure 2 below are significantly 
different from the official indicators presented for the corresponding period in 
Figure 1. They explain this difference “by the fact that the poverty line used in the 
analysis includes less poor individuals compared to the poverty line which is 
                                                 
43Kuznetcov and Nivorozhkina, p.233 
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based on the subsistence equivalent44”. They also claim to have a wider and more 
consistent definition of poverty and define their poverty line at 50% of average 
per capita disposable income.  
Interestingly, not just the actual figures (which may differ depending on the 
chosen measurement approaches and definitions) that are different, but also the 
proportionate changes as well. According to official estimates, the share of 
population below poverty line decreased by almost 40% between 2000 and 2005 
as shown in Figure 1. The estimates by Kuznetcov and Nivorozhkina, however, 
are less optimistic and report only a 15% reduction in the corresponding period of 
time as seen in Figure 2.  
Figure 2: Poverty rate and depth in Russia in 2000-2005.  
Source: Kuznetcov and Nivorozhkina 
 
Gerry, Nivorozhkin and Rigg45 use rounds 9-13 of RLMS for the period 
between 2000 and 2004. Their main measure of poverty is based on regional 
subsistence food basket adjusted for regional price variations.  They do not 
provide year-on-year estimations, but report a threefold poverty level reduction 
from 30.5% in 2000 to 10.1% in 2004. Again, these estimates are somewhat 
different from all other presented above and report the higher percentage change 
in poverty rate of all. Their most crucial and fundamental finding for building a 
poverty profile in Russia, however, is the ‘ruralisation’ of poverty. They 
                                                 
44Ibid  
45Gerry et al, p.595 
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decompose poverty rate under urban and rural to find that between 2000 and 2004 
there was a 78.6% poverty reduction in urban areas and 47.3% in rural.  
In general, the urban/rural divide is another type of inequality of distribution 
where there is a bias usually in favour of urban population. Along with inequality 
of income distribution to population in different income groups, the extent of this 
bias affects whether the poorest in some remote areas benefit from economic 
growth or not. If most of the economic gains occur and concentrate in the cities, 
the rural community will be unlikely to benefit. And although, the general level of 
poverty may be increasing as is reported in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the share of the 
poor in rural areas may remain stagnant.  
Distribution of wealth to population in different income groups has also been 
far from uniform and there is some evidence of growing income gap. Figure 3 
adapted from UNDP46 provides an overview of differentiation of income and 
wages using Gini47 and Funds48 coefficients.  Despite the observed trend of 
convergence in the average level of wages measured by both Gini and Funds 
coefficients, there has been a steady increase in the inequality level of incomes. 
Between 2000 and 2008 Gini index for incomes increased by 7% along with a 
26% increase in the Funds coefficient.  
Figure 3: Differentiation of income and wages. 
Source: UNDP 
                                                 
46UNDP 
47Measure of statistical dispersion used to measure the inequality of distribution. Takes the value 
of 0 where distribution is uniform, and 1 where there is maximum inequality. 
48Measure of social stratification defined as the income ratio between the highest earning decile 
and the lowest earning decile.   
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Summing up the evidence provided in this section, we can see that despite the 
differences in poverty definitions and approaches to its measurement, there is a 
consensus between the official statistics, data on extreme poverty by UNDP, FGT 
indices calculated by Kuznetcov and Nivorozhkina and estimations by Gerry et al, 
all of which show significant poverty reduction occurring since 2000, which is 
fundamental for our discussion. The phenomena of rising income inequality along 
with ‘ruralisation’ demonstrate important features of Russian poverty profile 
which must shape Russian social policy agenda. 
4. Growth and poverty: search for a relationship. 
The level of success achieved in a fight against poverty in Russia coincided 
with the period of strong economic performance. Figure 4 from UNDP49 
summarises a significant progress made in raising real incomes, wages and 
pensions, with each of the indicators increasing more than the national GDP in 
between 2000 and 2009. Between 2000 and 2008 the economy grew by 60% 
while real cash incomes more than doubled. 
Figure 4: Progress of real average per capita cash incomes, wages and pensions, % 
2000=100% 
Source: UNDP 
 
Yet, we have no grounds to claim that economic growth has been the driving 
force behind poverty reduction without making empirical estimations. In this 
section we provide an overview of literature on general connection between 
                                                 
49UNDP, p.26 
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poverty elimination and economic growth. The aim is to find whether economic 
growth benefits the poor and if there is a consensus on this issue amongst scholars 
and researchers. By the end of the section we will have outlined several 
hypotheses to be tested and explained in further sections. 
Even without getting deep into methodology and terminology of poverty and 
growth one may simply realise that as the national income increases, the average 
per capita income increases proportionately. This does not, however, mean or 
represent the actual increase in the level of incomes of all citizens, since just a few 
may benefit from growth due to unequal distribution of wealth. On the other hand, 
those few, who benefit from such growth, may indirectly increase the wealth of 
others by for example increasing the consumption of domestic goods and services, 
which in turn will make its producers either increase their production and 
expenditure or employ more labour force or both. Inputting more wealth into this 
circular flow of income is likely to affect many participants of the economy but 
the number and the share of those affected are the variables that determine the 
level of inequality of income distribution. 
Analysis of how an increase in GDP affects incomes and consumption of the 
most deprived helps to understand whether economic growth is good for the poor 
(pro-poor growth hereafter) or not (anti-poor growth hereafter50). Martin 
Ravallion51 quotes two opposing sides of a debate on whether the poor benefit 
from economic growth: ‘Growth really does help the poor: in fact it raises their 
incomes by about as much as it raises the incomes of everybody else… In short, 
globalization raises incomes, and the poor participate fully (The Economist, May 
27, 2000, p.94)’ and ‘There is plenty of evidence that current patterns of growth 
and globalization are widening income disparities and hence acting as a brake on 
poverty reduction (Justin Forsyth, Oxfam Policy Director, Letter to The 
Economist, June 20, 2000, p.6)’.  
The two conflicting opinions, however, are to some extent justified as the 
analysis by Ravallion proves. To test whether the poor share the growth in the 
average living standards he uses data sets for private consumption expenditure 
(PCE hereafter) per capita from the national accounts (NAS hereafter) and on the 
other hand, survey on average household living standards. Both approaches have 
their caveats and certain advantages, and do not agree in general either in the 
levels or in their growth rates, which again shows that much depends on the 
chosen definitions of poverty and methods of its measurement52.  
Ravallion finds that in both data sets there is either little or no correlation 
between growth in average per capita income and the change in measured 
                                                 
50The Political Economy of pro-poor growth’, p.3 
51Ravallion, ‘Growth…’, p.1803 
52Ibid, p.1804 
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inequality. There is low correlation of -.09 between the annualized log of Gini 
coefficient and the annualized change in the log of the survey mean income, but it 
is even lower when using growth rates in consumption from NAS (0.01). This is 
consistent with previous evidence found by Ravallion and Chen53 of the 
uncorrelated relationship between growth and inequality, and with findings by 
Dollar and Kraay54, who showed that the elasticity of income of the poor (change 
in log mean income of the 1st Quintile55to the change in log GDP per capita) is 
close to 1 and varies slightly depending on the regression method chosen. 
Therefore, one can conclude that that share of the poorest quintile is uncorrelated 
with GDP per capita.  
However, this does not imply that incomes of the poor change as much as the 
incomes of the rich. In proportion terms an increase in income may be equivalent 
across the population groups decomposed by income. In money terms, on the 
other hand, the gain for the poor is lower than the gain for the rich. Suppose 
average income in economy X changes from 1 to 2, i.e. doubles, while 
distribution proportions remain the same. Assume that for example the poor had 
5% of total income before and they get 5% after the average income doubles. 
Similarly, the share of the rich remains constant at 50%. Hence, before an increase 
in the average income level the poor had 0.05, while the rich had 0.5. After an 
increase the poor get  while the rich get . Therefore, 
rich got richer by 0.5, while the poor got richer only by 0.05.  
This simplified simulation shows that given existing inequality, income gains 
of the rich are greater than income gains of the poor despite the distribution 
neutral growth. Nevertheless, given the unchanged distributional shares, the poor 
still gain in absolute terms: growth reduces poverty, while contraction causes its 
increase56.  
Proportionate changes in the $1/day poverty rate (at Purchasing Power Parity, 
hereafter PPP) are plotted against the proportionate changes in the survey mean 
income on Figure 5, which is constructed using data for 47 developing countries 
in the 1980s and 1990s57.The regression line of the best fit passes through the 
origin, which means that at zero growth there is no poverty reduction. Since both 
axis are annualized changes in the logs, the slope of -2.50 (with standard error on 
0.30 and R-squared=0.44) can be interpreted as the “growth elasticity of 
poverty”58. This implies that for every 1% increase in the average income, there is 
                                                 
53Ravallion and Chen, p.371 
54Dollar and Kraay, p.205  
55Hereafter 1st Quintile will refer to the share in total income by the poorest 20% of the population, 
5th Quintile – the richest. 
56Ravallion, ‘Growth…’, p.1806 
57Ibid 
58Ibid 
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a 2.5% poverty reduction (as measured by the proportion of those living on below 
$1/day at 1993 PPP).  As can further be seen from the graph, there is no evidence 
that elasticity depends on which way the mean moves. 
                   
Figure 5: Poverty and mean household income. 
Source: Martin Ravallion ‘Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyond Averages’ 
 
The relationship is similar using PCE per capita from NAS, although, the 
coefficient is weaker (-1.96) and has a higher standard error (0.89), although is 
statistically significant at 3%. 
Figure 6 based on World Bank’s Development Indicators 2003, constructed by 
Hayami and Godo59compares FGT poverty indices and average GDP per capita 
for 44 countries. The upper graph plots head-count index (hereafter HCI) 
measured by the share of people living on below $1/day (at PPP) against the 
average per capita GDP, while the lower graph represents poverty gap index 
(hereafter PGI) measured by the sum of differences in poor people’s incomes  
from poverty line plotted also against average GDP per capita. In both cases there 
is obvious negative relationship between poverty and GDP per capita with 
correlation coefficients of -0.85 for HCI and -0.82 for PGI.  
                                                 
59Hayami and Godo, p.205 
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 Figure 6: International comparison of absolute poverty. 
Source: Yujiro Hayami and Yoshihisa Godo ‘Development Economics. From the…’ 
 
Using the same datasets, Hayami and Godo ran linear regressions, where HCI 
and PGI were dependent variables and took logistic forms, i.e. 
and , while independent variables were logs of 
average GDP per capita across countries.  
The estimated coefficients appeared to be negative and statistically significant 
in both cases, indicating a decline in poverty levels following an increase in the 
average per capita GDP. There are caveats of this analysis, however, related, first 
to the static cross-country data used without adding any time dimension, and 
second, to a not wide enough range of values and the number of countries 
analysed. Nevertheless, within the data range of World Development Indicators 
2003 Hayami and Godo find evidence to support their hypothesis that “prevalence 
of poverty among all people in society (as measured by HCI) as well as the degree 
of poverty among poor people (as measure by PGI) tend to decline monotonously 
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corresponding to increases in average GDP per capita…”60. They conclude that 
low levels of average GDP per capita is the fundamental cause of poverty, and 
therefore, achieving rapid economic growth is vital for developing countries with 
a desire of poverty reduction.    
By adding regional and central planning dummies to the same regression 
Hayami and Godo61 assess the effects of inequality along with average GDP per 
capita. Central planning dummy has negative coefficients which may be  
explained by the lower levels of inequality associated with this type of economic 
regime, while coefficients for Africa and Latin America are positive and 
statistically significant, potentially implying that the level of poverty is 
“influenced by inequality, which is determined as a part of the economic and 
social system formed historically through the choices of economic policies and ad 
hoc social and political events such as colonialism in the past62”. So, when 
estimating the explanations for poverty using regressions one has to also account 
for factors other than average income. 
In general, there is to a large extent a consensus between several contemporary 
scholars, like Dollar and Kraay63, Ravallion64, Hayami and Godo65 amongst others 
who show and prove that growth is good, and even essential for poverty 
reduction. This does not imply, however, that growth necessarily benefits the poor 
as much as it benefits the rich, as it was outlined above. Neither does it mean that 
growth is the only factor affecting poverty levels; although, using the arguments 
and evidence of data presented by these scholars one can argue that growth is the 
fundamental one.  
These findings, however, are based on aggregate cross-country empirical 
estimations and applying these blindly to Russia in our case and arguing that the 
growth experienced in the period between 2000 and 2008 must have been the 
driving force behind the poverty reduction would be unjustified. In order to 
achieve our aim of finding the effects of economic performance during the 
analysed period, we need to check and test several hypotheses.  
The most general and perhaps the most significant is the “growth elasticity of 
poverty” tested by Ravallion and Chen66 on a cross-country level. Our original 
hypothesis, justified by the aforementioned findings, is that growth in the average 
per capita GRP negatively affects poverty levels. 
                                                 
60Ibid, p.206 
61Ibid p.207 
62Ibid. 
63Dollar and Kray 
64Ravallion, ‘Growth…’  
65Hayami and Godo 
66Ravallion and Chen, p.369 
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Our second hypothesis to be tested also stems from the claim by Ravallion that 
there is either little or no correlation between growth in average money income 
and change in inequality67. The application of this hypothesis for Russia will be 
tested. 
As was mentioned in Section 2 of this paper, measuring poverty simply by a 
number of people or households whose incomes fall behind certain consumption 
threshold may be misleading in a way that it does not show the overall picture of 
the social well-being. In addition to the hypotheses above, it will be tested 
whether economic growth of 2000-2008 positively affected other social indicators 
like housing, education, and healthcare, since a person who is deprived of access 
to any of these has justifications to be deemed ‘poor’. 
5. Data and methodology. 
a. Data 
The data used for testing the outlined hypotheses and finding empirical 
estimations in this study comes from Rosstat publications and from their official 
web-site68. There have been recent concerns among scholars and researchers 
regarding the reliability of data published by Rosstat69. Nevertheless, this is the 
official statistics used for assessing the performance by government officials and 
policy makers and its use is justifiable, especially given no alternative regional 
indicators. But one has to keep in mind its limitations. 
As of January 2011, the are 83 regions in the Russian Federation that include 
oblasts, krais, republics, autonomous okrugs and two cities of federal 
subordinations – Moscow and Saint-Petersburg. Most models and regressions to 
follow will be based on figures for all regions apart from Chechen Republic due to 
the unavailability of data for several years years; Kamchatka Krai/Oblast, due to 
the difficulty in measurements after  Kamchatka Oblast merged with Koryak 
Autonomous Region in 2007; Zabayakalsky Krai/Chita Oblast/Agin-Buryat 
Autonomous Okrug, due to the same problem after the latter two merged to 
become the former; Khanty-Mansi Autonomous region, Yamalo-Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug, and Nenets Autonomous Okrug, all due to the uncalculated 
gross regional products (GRP) for autonomous regions  because of the 
incommensurability of data on average constantly residing population and the 
                                                 
67Ravallion, ‘Growth…’, p.1805 
68Rosstat, all data is from ‘Regions of Russia. Socio-economic indicators’ publications available at 
http://gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/rosstatsite/main/publishing/catalog/statisticCollections/doc_
1138623506156 
69For instance, experts from National Research University “Higher School of Economics” claim 
that Rosstat manipulated with data to report economic growth of 4% in 2010, Reznikova ‘Eksperty 
somnevayutsya v dostovernosti dannyh Rosstata’.  
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results of economic activity performed in the region70. There are therefore 77 
regions used in the analysis of the 2000-2008 period. 
Gross regional product (hereafter GRP) per capita, income per capita and 
government spending are presented by Rosstat in nominal terms only; therefore 
they are converted into constant 2000 prices using regional consumer price index 
(hereafter CPI). The caveat of such approach is the excludability of price changes 
for certain goods and services that may have significant weight in expenditure 
lists of both households and governments. Nevertheless, it is the most applicable 
approach in our case, since it would be insensible to apply two different inflation 
indices for government and household as well as it would not make much sense to 
account for increasing housing prices, for instance, in estimating real household 
incomes. In any of the indices estimated hereafter 2000 is taken as the base year. 
b. Methodology. 
In order to test the first most fundamental hypothesis of this study we estimate 
the growth elasticity of regional poverty. We then also add regional and time 
binary variables to see whether there are certain regions and years where poverty 
explanations are significantly different from the other. In order to test for 
elasticity we take the logarithms of dependent and explanatory variables. The 
basic model party adapted from the works by Takeda71as follows: 
 
In order to try to improve the goodness of fit we gradually add some other 
explanatory variables as suggested by Takeda72 to get the following: 
 
 
 
where is poverty rate in region i (i=1, …, N) at year t (t=1, …, T); is the 
unknown intercept;  is the growth elasticity of poverty coefficient; is 
a the real per capita GRP in region i (i=1, …, N) at year t (t=1, …, T);  is the 
                                                 
70Rosstat, available at http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_14p/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/11-02.htm 
71Takeda, p.5 
72Ibid 
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government spending elasticity of poverty coefficient;  is the real 
government spending per capita in region i (i=1, …, N) at year t (t=1, …, T); is 
a coefficient for the regional binary repressor  (i=2, …, N)73;  is a coefficient 
for the binary time regressor  (t=2, …, T)74; is an individual unobserved 
effect for region i (i=1, …, N);  is an error term in region i (i=1, …, N) at year t 
(t=1, …, T).  
Apart from that, we split our data into two different periods: 2000-2004 and 
2005-2008 to see whether the patterns are significantly different. For a period of 
1999-2002 Takeda75 reported a significant drop in growth elasticity of poverty76, 
so we also separately estimate this indicator for 2000-2002 to check if its similar 
to estimations by Takeda who used a slightly different model.  We also try 
splitting the regions into two groups: 38 with highest poverty rates and 39 with 
lowest poverty rates as of 2000 to see whether there are signs of convergence. 
To test our second hypothesis we use Rosstat’s regional Gini and Funds 
coefficient indicators and check for correlation between annualized changes in the 
logs of Gini and Funds indices and the annualized changes in the logs of average 
money income per capita for 2002-200877. We also correlate changes in the logs 
of the share of total money income for different income groups (quintiles) to 
changes in the logs of mean income per capita for 2000-2008.We further test the 
relationship of changes in the log shares of incomes of each of the quintile groups 
and changes in the logs of Gini and Funds indices to the changes in the log mean 
money income per capita. The simple models as follow: 
 
where  is the share of income of the xth income quintile group (1, …, X; 1st 
quintile represents 20% of population with the lowest incomes, 5th quintile 
represents 20% of population with the highest incomes) in region i (i=1, …, N) at 
year t (t=1, …, T);  is a Gini index for region i (i=1, …, N) at year t (t=1, …, 
T);  is a Funds index for region i (i=1, …, N) at year t (t=1, …, T); 
is the income elasticity coefficient; and   is the real income 
                                                 
73There n-1 entities since E is a binary variable 
74There t-1 entities since T is a binary variable 
75Takeda, p.6 
76They obtained -0.607 for 1996-2008 and -0.192 for 1999-2002 
77There is no Rosstat data on regional Gini and Funds indices for 2000 and 2001. 
19
Maltsev: Economic Growth and Poverty in Russia, 2000-2008
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2011
per capita accounted for CPI in region i (i=1, …, N) at year t (t=1, …, T).All other 
variable are as above (equations 1-4).  
To test our final hypothesis we attempt to find the relationship between 
increasing GRP per capita and other social indicators. In particular, we test 
whether economic growth significantly affected those in need of housing. There 
are two housing indicators we find useful for analysis: absolute number of those 
registered as in need of housing and absolute number of those who used to be 
registered as in need of housing but acquired or improved housing in a given year 
in a given region.  Considering that government usually plays a pivotal role in 
provision of social housing and other essential public goods we again add mean 
government spending per capita to our estimations as another explanatory 
variable.   
We then test whether economic growth and government spending led to 
increasing numbers of students in professional and higher education per 10,000 of 
population. This stems from a logical assumption that as the productivity in the 
economy increases, the demand for highly-skilled labour is also likely to increase. 
And also, if some part of the increasing real government spending is devoted to 
promotion and development of higher and professional education the numbers of 
students should be on the rise. 
Our last indicator of changes in social welfare is healthcare provision and its 
relationship with growth in real per capita GRP and government spending. Given 
ambiguity in measuring the quantity and quality of healthcare services, we only 
pick the most crucial variables, such as the number of hospital beds and doctors 
per 10,000 people to measure ‘quantity’; and the number of sicknesses78 per 
10,000 people to measure ‘quality’ in healthcare provision79.  
To test this hypothesis we use similar approaches as described in the beginning 
of this section (equation 2). Most models have certain caveats and are not 
unconditionally reliable in estimating the exact numerical relationships and they 
are not supposed to be. Therefore, the models presented in this study do not claim 
to find perfectly accurate empirical estimations, but rather analyse the general 
trend and the significance of certain factors and effects. 
 
 
 
                                                 
78Number of sicknesses here reflects a number of people per 10,000 diagnosed with a new disease. 
79These are simplified methods of measuring ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ of healthcare provision, but 
given a different field of this study we are not going into details of proper indicators found in 
papers specifically devoted to the problem.  
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6. Empirical results. 
Hypothesis 1: Growth is good for the poor. 
Full details of our estimations using ordinary least squares (hereafter OLS), 
fixed effect (hereafter FE) and random effect (hereafter RE) are presented in 
Tables 2A-23A80 of the Appendix section. We do not aim do provide an exact and 
most appropriate estimation result and will not therefore test which of the three 
estimations best fits the data, but we shall rather outline the trends and discuss 
hypothetical limitations of our models.  
We start with our first and most fundamental hypothesis and test whether 
economic growth of 2000-2008 has been of benefit for the poor of Russia. We 
find three different statistically significant estimations of growth elasticity of 
poverty for our first model (equation 1). The pooled OLS estimation and a two-
way scatter diagram on Figure 7 below represent the least optimistic results of the 
three estimations but still report a relatively high coefficient of -0.5195 (R-square 
= 0.5252). This means that across 77 regions in a given time period for every 1% 
increase in the average GRP per capita there has been a 0.5195% decrease in 
poverty level.  Using FE and RE models we find these coefficients to be       -
1.1088 and -0.9744 (same overall R-squared = 0.5259) respectively all significant 
at 1% significance level. Full details can be found in Table 2A. 
 
                                                 
80
“A” in the end of the Table number means the table is found in the Appendix section. 
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y=-0.5195x+8.595
Adj. R-squared=0.5252
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Figure 7: Regional poverty rate and real GRP per capita, 2000-2008. 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
We then add average real (nominal accounted for CPI inflation) government 
spending to our models to improve the goodness of fit as suggested by Takeda81, 
that does not however change either the results or the goodness of fit radically. 
The results are outlined in Table 3A. For OLS, FE and RE we get statistically 
significant at 1% level growth elasticity of poverty coefficients of -0.5717 (R-
squared = 0.5307), -1.0448 (overall R-squared = 0.5200) and -0.8753 (overall R-
squared = 0.5168) respectively. With regard to government spending elasticity of 
poverty the results are as follows: 0.0711 for OLS, -0.0606 for FE and -0.0745 for 
RE. Interestingly, the OLS estimation has a positive coefficient, while for the 
other two it is negative. But there is no reason to assume that increasing 
government expenditure can also contribute to increase in poverty.  
We then split our time frame into two periods - 2000-2004 and 2005-2008 
(Tables 4A and 5A), to check which has been more ‘productive’ in poverty 
reduction.  Findings show that during the earlier period positive changes in 
average GRP per capita and, more importantly in this case, positive changes in 
average per capita government spending have been more pro-poor than in the later 
period. In particular, using OLS we find -0.5274 (R-squared = 0.5384) for 2000-
                                                 
81Takeda, p.5 
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2004 and -0.5063 (R-squared = 0.4420) for 2004-2008; -1.0429 (overall R-
squared = 0.4838) and -0.7517 (overall R-squared = 0.3843) using FE; -0.7033 
(overall R-squared = 0.4881) and -0.5750 (overall R-squared = 0.3827) using RE, 
all in favour of the earlier period. There are two interesting features of these 
estimations: first, the goodness of fit as measured by R-squared is much lower for 
the later period, and second, the coefficients for government spending are either 
insignificant or less significant when using FE and RE models for 2005-2008. In 
theory this could mean a switch of social policies away from direct welfare 
support. With OLS estimations, government spending elasticity of poverty has 
positive values for both periods, so we disregard it, since it is not realistic.  
Table 6A summarizes the results we obtained for 2000-2002 in order to 
compare with Takeda’s82 estimations for 1999-2002. We get different statistically 
significant results using our models than those obtained by Takeda. For growth 
elasticity of poverty we get -0.4915 (overall R-squared = 0.3648) using FE 
compared to -0.195 (overall R-squared = 0.34) found by Takeda; and -0.4360 
using RE (overall R-squared = 0.4546) compared to Takeda’s -0.336 (overall R-
squared = 0.54). With regard to the effect of government spending we get -0.2968 
and -0.0970 for FE and RE respectively compared to -0.322 and -0.198 found by 
Takeda. The difference can be explained by the exclusion of year 1999 in our 
estimations. With this explanation in mind we conclude that the process of 
poverty elimination has been more effective since 2000, and economic growth has 
been more pro-poor since then.  
In order to finally confirm that the growth which occurred in the period 
between 2000 and 2008 was pro-poor we test for growth elasticity of poverty 
separately for regions with lowest and highest poverty rates as of 2000. List of 
regions belonging to the two groups can be found in Table 1A. Analysing the 
results we obtained from running this regression one can see that growth in real 
per capita GRP in regions with higher poverty was associated with stronger 
poverty reduction as measured by growth elasticity of poverty. For 38 regions 
which had the higher levels of poverty in 2000 we obtained the following results: 
-0.5358 using OLS (R-squared=0.4531), -1.2024 using FE (overall R-
squared=0.4547) and with RE we got -1.0604 (overall R-squared=0.4547), all 
statistically significant under 1% level. Results for 39 regions with lowest level of 
poverty as of 2000 in the same order: -0.4158 (R-squared=0.4214), -0.4231 
(overall R-squared=0.4231) and -0.8690 (overall R-squared=0.4231). This 
provides us with evidence that economic growth in poorer regions was associated 
with about a 20% higher poverty reduction rate when compared with the richer 
regions and there are therefore signs of convergence.  
We also added regional and time dummies (equation 3 and 4) to find no 
uniformity across regions in their binary indicators with majority being positive. It 
                                                 
82Takeda, p.13, Table 2 
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may come as a surprise that regions like Republic of Ingushetia and the Republic 
of Dagestan usually associated with higher levels of unemployment and instability 
both have negative regional dummies. This can be explained by a huge drop in 
official poverty rates (eg. from 72.6% in 2000 to 10.1% in 2008 for Dagestan), but 
accuracy of these indicators is questionable. Nevertheless, details of this 
regression are summarized in Table 9A. In Table 10A there are also added time 
binary variables, values of which decrease year on year confirming a steady 
decline of population living below poverty line throughout the analysed period.  
The results obtained and explained above, we believe, are sufficient to support 
our first hypothesis and so we claim that growth of average per capita GRP 
experienced between 2000 and 2008 negatively and significantly affected poverty 
levels. With support of the results obtained after splitting the tested regions into 
more and less poor and finding stronger effect on regions with higher poverty 
levels as of 2000, we further conclude that economic growth associated with the 
aforementioned period was pro-poor. One, however, has to keep in mind 
limitations of the official definition of national poverty line. 
Hypothesis 2: Growth does not affect inequality. 
Here we test relationships between growth in money income and inequality, 
which were found to be uncorrelated by Dollar and Kraay83 and Ravallion84. We 
first check for relationships between average real income per capita85 and income 
shares of each of the quintile groups from poorest to richest. Table 2 represents a 
correlation matrix between the outlined variables.  
 Real 
GRP per 
capita 
1st 
Quintile 
(poorest) 
2nd 
Quintile 
3rd 
Quintile 
4th 
Quintile 
5th 
Quintile 
(richest) 
Real GRP per 
capita 
1.0000      
1st Quintile 
(poorest) 
-0.6918 1.0000     
2nd Quintile -0.6644 0.9883 1.0000    
3rd Quintile -0.6283 0.9648 0.9917 1.0000   
4th Quintile -0.4843 0.8120 0.8785 0.9279 1.0000  
5th Quintile 
(richest) 
0.6943 -0.9977      -0.9815      -0.9542      -0.7915 1.0000 
Table 2: Correlation matrix between real GRP per capita and income shares of population 
quintiles. 
Source: Author’s estimations 
 
                                                 
83Dollar and Kraay, p.221 
84Ravallion, ‘Growth…’, p.1805 
85Hereafter “income” will mean average income per capita accounted for CPI 
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Contrary to the observations by Ravallion and Dollar and Kraay we find strong 
correlation between income and inequality. In particular, as can be seen from the 
above correlation matrix, growth in income levels is associated with decreasing 
income shares of each of the quintile groups apart from the richest. It can also be 
seen that correlation increases with each quintile implying that the poor are the 
least to benefit from the rising average income levels. This does not contradict our 
previous finding of economic growth causing a decline in poverty levels, but it 
rather shows that despite the poor getting more in real terms, their share falls as 
the “pie” gets bigger. 
We also checked for relationship between income and official figures on Gini 
and Funds coefficients for 2002-2008 and found strong positive correlation of 
0.7073 between Gini index and income; and of 0.7091 between income and Funds 
index. This illustrates that rising income levels are associated with rising 
inequality in Russia.  
Regression analysis of increasing average income on income shares of each of 
the population quintiles (equation 5) yielded interesting results summarised in 
Tables 11A-15A. There is evidence of significant positive relationship between 
income growth and inequality measured by income shares of each of the quintile 
groups. In order for distribution of economic gains to be uniform, the coefficients 
have to be close to zero, which is not the result of our analysis. We find that only 
the richest 20% of the population increase their share in total average income, 
while all other group lose, with the poorest 20% losing the most. It can also be 
seen that apart from the 1st quintile having the lowest elasticity of income share 
coefficient, the model has one of the highest goodness of fit indicators with OLS, 
FE or RE R-squared being 0.4778 (adjusted), 0.4785 (overall) and 0.4785 
(overall) respectively. In terms of R-squared it only loses to the 5th Quintile, 
which means that the proportions of variability accounted for in the dataset are the 
highest for the richest quintile followed by the poorest quintile. These are 
worrying signs indicating economic divergence. 
Tables 16A and 17A outline regression results of income on Gini and Funds 
indices for 2002-2008. We estimate all regression coefficients to be positive and 
significant under 1% level for each model.  We find that for every 1% increase in 
income there is 0.4001% (adjusted R-squared=0.5035), 0.3925% (overall R-
squared=0.5044) and 0.3929% (overall R-squared=0.5044) increase in Funds 
coefficient when applying OLS, FE and RE models respectively. So, effectively 
about a 2.5% increase in GRP leads to a 1% increase in the Funds coefficient and 
since it represents an average income ratio of the highest earning decile to the 
lowest earning decile, i.e. 
, the obtained 
results ultimately mean that either the highest earners increase their average 
income by 1% while income of the lowest earners remains the same; or it is the 
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lowest earners who have their income reduced by 0.9% ceteris paribus for every 
2.5% increase in average income. In any case, this shows that lowest earners lose 
relative to the highest earners.  As for the Gini coefficient, it increases by 1% for 
about every 6.6% increase in income as we estimate regression coefficients for 
OLS, FE and RE to be 0.1470 (adjusted R-squared=0.4994), 0.1545 (overall R-
squared=0.5003) and 0.1538 (overall R-squared=0.5003) respectively. Gini and 
Funds indices are highly correlated with a coefficient of 0.9772. 
We find enough evidence to reject our original hypothesis and state that as the 
average incomes rises, inequality in Russia increases. This contrasts with some 
findings outlined in Section 4.Ravallion and Chen86 did find positive relationship 
between inequality and growth in income levels in Eastern Europe, however the 
effect was estimated to be insignificant. 
Hypothesis 3: Growth is associated with improvements in other social well-
being indicators -education, housing and healthcare. 
As the economy increases in size, the demand for skilled labour is also likely to 
increase. Rosstat data supports this claim with data on increasing number of 
students across regions. However whether growth per se is the reason behind the 
increasing education enrolment numbers is not clear. Our estimate of correlation 
between log of annualised average GRP per capita and log of number of students 
in higher and professional education is 0.3673. However, regression analysis does 
not provide strong evidence of economic growth significantly affecting education. 
Despite the coefficients of 0.2042 using OLS, 0.0524 using FE and of 0.0522 
using RE all being significant under 1%, the models are weak due to low 
goodness of fit as measured by R-squared. The results are outlined in Table 18A.  
We faced the same problem when conducted a regression of average GRP per 
capita and government spending on the annual number of people who acquired 
housing and improved housing conditions; and on the number of people registered 
as in need of housing. We found no significant evidence of either GRP or 
government spending positively affecting housing conditions across Russian 
regions between 2000 and 2008. Despite some coefficients being strong and 
significant we cannot use them for explanations due to their low goodness of fit. 
Nevertheless, estimations are listed in Tables 19A and 20A. 
Testing for relationship between GRP and improvements in “quantity” and 
“quality” of healthcare did not yield trustworthy results either. There is evidence 
of falling number of hospital beds per 10,000 people, however, despite having 
strong and significant coefficients, economic growth and government spending 
account for more than 7% of variation as seen in Table 21A. We had better 
goodness of fit when regressed GRP and government spending indicators on 
                                                 
86Ravallion and Chen, 371. 
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number of doctors per 10,000 people with overall and adjusted R-squared of about 
0.18 when using OLS, FE and RE models but found low coefficients of 0.1614, 
0.0702 and 0.0714, all listed in Table 22A. Economic growth and government 
spending also fail to explain the rising number of diagnosed new diseases per 
10,000 due to the lack of evidence as summarised in Table 23A. However, 
increasing sickness level per se and its positive correlations of 0.4231 with 
average GRP per capita and of 0.3198 with real government spending per capita 
should be a worrying indicator for Russian policy makers. 
Therefore, despite these social indicators changing both ways, there is not 
enough evidence that either economic growth or increasing government spending 
in Russia between 2000 and 2008 were the forces behind these changes. 
7. Concluding remarks. 
Summing up the above said, there are three important findings of our analysis:  
a) Growth in real per capita GRP has been associated with reduction of official 
poverty levels across Russia throughout the period between 2000 and 2008. 
b) Growth in real money incomes has been accompanied by widening inequality 
measured by increasing Funds and Gini coefficients, and by the rising income 
share of the richest quintile group of population.  
c) Steadily increasing real per capita GRP and government spending have not 
acted as the main catalysts for changes in housing provision, professional and 
higher education levels as well as ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ of healthcare. 
 Therefore, based on Rosstat data we can claim that poverty has been 
decreasing at a high rate and our calculations support the hypothesis that the 
growth was pro-poor. On the other hand, a big problem associated with Russian 
economic development was the rising level of income inequality. This 
phenomenon requires further analysis in order to draw policy recommendations, 
but we attempt to outline some hypothetical reasons.  
It is essential to note the inverted-U-shape hypothesis on income distribution 
first pointed out by Simon Kuznets87. He considered initial increases in inequality 
levels in the early stage of development followed by their gradual reductions. 
There is no empirical regularity to firmly support this proposition88 but one can 
speculate and suggest that during the analysed period Russia might have been at 
the stage of development, where inequality is on the rise and gradual reductions 
are to follow.  
Figure 4 previously demonstrated in Section 3 shows high differentiation of 
wages, which according to UNDP contributes to overall high income 
differentiation and is caused by budget sector wages, the pension system and 
                                                 
87Kuznets, p.27 
88Hayami and Godo, p.199 
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social support programmes growing more slowly than wages in market-driven 
sectors89. Despite the indicator decreasing, it still remains high and above overall 
income differentiation. Low mobility of labour between industrial sectors might 
impede the wage catch-up process in sectors with slower rates of development and 
productivity growth. Worsening obstacles to small and medium size 
entrepreneurship outlined in World Bank’s Doing Business Report90  ‘de-
incentivise’ from seeking alternative sources of incomes while difficulty in getting 
micro-credit prevent the least privileged from economic participation.  
Keeping in mind the conclusion made by Gerry et al. that poverty has become 
a largely rural phenomenon91 (hence the growing income differentiation between 
urban and rural population), institutional development must play a pivotal role in 
reducing inequality. Rule of law, property protection, financial deregulation and 
less state intervention are the likely factors to contribute to greater equality. 
Applying redistribution measures, such as a move away from flat to progressive 
income tax system and increasing inheritance tax from 13%92, accompanied by 
increases in budget sector wages might underlie equalisation in income 
distribution. Improvement of social insurance and social support systems along 
with a development of micro-credit infrastructure will facilitate economic activity 
among the underprivileged.  Nevertheless, the problem needs further empirical 
investigation before making certain conclusions. 
While we have not found any empirical relationship between several social 
indicators and economic growth mentioned in the previous section, we can still 
outline significant progress made in achieving greater number of higher and 
professional education students – an average 44% increase between 2000 and 
200893; and a 34% reduction in number of people registered as in need of housing. 
Despite a 6% increase in the number of doctors per 10,000, policy makers should 
worry about a 13% reduction in number of hospital beds per 10,000 accompanied 
by a 6% increase in a number of diagnosed illnesses. 
We finally conclude that although there are clear sings of poverty levels per se 
decreasing with economic growth, evidence of improvement of social wellbeing is 
ambiguous. A further study on problems and causes of inequality and an in-depth 
analysis of social indicators are needed to draw a more complete picture of the 
evolving standards of living in Russia.  
                                                 
89UNDP, p.28 
90
‘Doing Business 2011’, p.4 
91Gerry et al., p.606 
92The Tax Code of Russian Federation, Article 224. 
93All figures in the paragraph are author’s estimations based on data available from Rosstat 
website. 
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Table 9A: Regression of poverty for Russia in 2000-2008 
    
 Pooled OLS/ Random Effect (RE)  
  Coef.   Std.error t-value   
Log of real GRP per capita -1.0448 *** 0.0283 -36.9200  
Log of real Gov.spending per 
capita -0.0606 *** 0.0191 -3.1700  
Constant 14.3334 *** 0.2079 68.9500  
      
Region      
Altai Republic 0.1833 *** 0.0706 2.6000  
Amur Oblast 0.6966 *** 0.0689 10.1200  
Arkhangelsk Oblast 0.5595 *** 0.0705 7.9400  
Astrakhan Oblast 0.0043  0.0684 0.0600  
Belgorod Oblast 0.0949  0.0690 1.3700  
Bryansk Oblast -0.2768 *** 0.0681 -4.0700  
Chelyabinsk Oblast 0.1537 ** 0.0696 2.2100  
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 1.4431 *** 0.0780 18.4900  
Chuvash Republic 0.0086  0.0681 0.1300  
Irkutsk Oblast 0.5925 *** 0.0696 8.5100  
Ivanovo Oblast 0.1606 ** 0.0684 2.3500  
Jewish Autonomous Oblast 0.4169 *** 0.0689 6.0500  
Kabardino-Balkar Republic -0.2888 *** 0.0683 -4.2300  
Kaliningrad Oblast 0.2920 *** 0.0688 4.2400  
Kaluga Oblast 0.0400  0.0682 0.5900  
Karachay-Cherkess Republic -0.2432 *** 0.0685 -3.5500  
Kemerovo Oblast 0.0765  0.0693 1.1000  
Khabarovsk Krai 0.5270 *** 0.0695 7.5800  
Kirov Oblast 0.0606  0.0681 0.8900  
Komi Republic 0.6783 *** 0.0719 9.4300  
Kostroma Oblast 0.0528  0.0681 0.7800  
Krasnodar Krai 0.2829 *** 0.0687 4.1200  
Krasnoyarsk Krai 0.7809 *** 0.0713 10.9600  
Kurgan Oblast 0.0691  0.0680 1.0200  
Kursk Oblast -0.0122  0.0685 -0.1800  
Leningrad Oblast 0.5848 *** 0.0711 8.2200  
Lipetsk Oblast 0.3076 *** 0.0703 4.3800  
Magadan Oblast 0.9795 *** 0.0729 13.4400  
Mari El Republic 0.2224 *** 0.0681 3.2700  
Moscow  1.4396 *** 0.0784 18.3700  
Moscow Oblast 0.1973 *** 0.0691 2.8500  
Murmansk Oblast 0.6103 *** 0.0707 8.6300  
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 0.0757  0.0693 1.0900  
Novgorod Oblast 0.3955 *** 0.0689 5.7400  
Novosibirsk Oblast 0.4884 *** 0.0689 7.0800  
Omsk Oblast -1.0204 *** 0.0690 -14.7800  
Orenburg Oblast 0.5634 *** 0.0700 8.0500  
Oryol Oblast 0.1527 ** 0.0684 2.2300  
Penza Oblast -0.0830  0.0681 -1.2200  
Perm Krai 0.2784 *** 0.0832 3.3500  
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Primorsky Krai 0.6523 *** 0.0689 9.4600  
Pskov Oblast -0.1385 ** 0.0681 -2.0300  
Republic of Adygea -0.3014 *** 0.0689 -4.3700  
Republic of Bashkortostan 0.1322 * 0.0691 1.9100  
Republic of Buryatia 0.4903 *** 0.0684 7.1700  
Republic of Dagestan -0.3589 *** 0.0686 -5.2300  
Republic of Ingushetia -0.6284 *** 0.0768 -8.1800  
Republic of Kalmykia 0.2995 *** 0.0692 4.3300  
Republic of Karelia 0.2370 *** 0.0694 3.4200  
Republic of Khakassia 0.3413 *** 0.0687 4.9700  
Republic of Mordovia 0.1030  0.0686 1.5000  
Republic of North Ossetia-Alania -0.4831 *** 0.0686 -7.0400  
Republic of Tatarstan 0.3109 *** 0.0703 4.4200  
Rostov Oblast -0.1984 *** 0.0683 -2.9100  
Ryazan Oblast 0.1480 ** 0.0684 2.1600  
Saint Petersburg 0.2135 *** 0.0756 2.8300  
Sakha (Yakutia) Republic 1.2646 *** 0.0740 17.1000  
Sakhalin Oblast 1.2520 *** 0.0746 16.7900  
Samara Oblast 0.5176 *** 0.0716 7.2300  
Saratov Oblast 0.2564 *** 0.0685 3.7400  
Smolensk Oblast -0.1167 * 0.0684 -1.7100  
Stavropol Krai -0.0276  0.0681 -0.4100  
Sverdlovsk Oblast 0.1140  0.0698 1.6300  
Tambov Oblast -0.2128 *** 0.0682 -3.1200  
Tomsk Oblast 0.4868 *** 0.0709 6.8700  
Tula Oblast -0.1869 *** 0.0683 -2.7300  
Tuva Republic 0.2575 *** 0.0707 3.6400  
Tver Oblast 0.1392 ** 0.0684 2.0400  
Tyumen Oblast 1.7092 *** 0.0843 20.2900  
Udmurt Republic 0.3011 *** 0.0688 4.3700  
Ulyanovsk Oblast 0.0218  0.0681 0.3200  
Vladimir Oblast 0.1398 ** 0.0682 2.0500  
Volgograd Oblast -0.0910  0.0687 -1.3300  
Vologda Oblast 0.5462 *** 0.0749 7.2900  
Voronezh Oblast 0.0132  0.0682 0.1900  
Yaroslavl Oblast 0.1399 ** 0.0691 2.0200  
      
Number of observations 693     
Number of groups    77  
Adjusted R-squared 0.8958     
Within R-squared    0.8360  
Between R-squared    1.0000  
Overall R-squared    0.9076  
F test (prob>F) 0.0000         
Breusch & Pagan test (prob>chi2)       0.0000   
    
Source: Author's estimation.      
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Table 10A: Regression of poverty for Russia in 2000-2008 
   
 Pooled OLS/ Random Effect (RE)  
  Coef.   Std.error t-value  
Log of real GRP per capita -0.5252 *** 0.0508 -10.3300  
Log of real Gov.spending per 
capita -0.0110  0.0174 -0.6300  
Constant 9.0275 *** 0.4880 18.5000  
      
Region      
Altai Republic 0.1978 *** 0.0617 3.2100  
Amur Oblast 0.3952 *** 0.0652 6.0600  
Arkhangelsk Oblast 0.0912  0.0731 1.2500  
Astrakhan Oblast -0.1643 *** 0.0613 -2.6800  
Belgorod Oblast -0.1754 *** 0.0644 -2.7200  
Bryansk Oblast -0.2381 *** 0.0594 -4.0100  
Chelyabinsk Oblast -0.1514 ** 0.0660 -2.2900  
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 0.4713 *** 0.1062 4.4400  
Chuvash Republic 0.0045  0.0593 0.0800  
Irkutsk Oblast 0.2085 *** 0.0689 3.0300  
Ivanovo Oblast 0.2682 *** 0.0603 4.4500  
Jewish Autonomous Oblast 0.2442 *** 0.0618 3.9500  
Kabardino-Balkar Republic -0.1666 *** 0.0605 -2.7600  
Kaliningrad Oblast 0.0032  0.0647 0.0500  
Kaluga Oblast -0.1035 * 0.0607 -1.7000  
Karachay-Cherkess Republic -0.1201 *** 0.0607 -1.9800  
Kemerovo Oblast -0.2732 *** 0.0673 -4.0600  
Khabarovsk Krai 0.1169 * 0.0698 1.6800  
Kirov Oblast 0.0011  0.0596 0.0200  
Komi Republic 0.0607  0.0816 0.7400  
Kostroma Oblast -0.0334  0.0598 -0.5600  
Krasnodar Krai 0.0814  0.0623 1.3100  
Krasnoyarsk Krai 0.2060 *** 0.0789 2.6100  
Kurgan Oblast 0.0751  0.0593 1.2700  
Kursk Oblast -0.1381  0.0607 -2.2800  
Leningrad Oblast 0.2103 *** 0.0698 3.0100  
Lipetsk Oblast -0.1265 * 0.0715 -1.7700  
Magadan Oblast 0.2510 *** 0.0883 2.8400  
Mari El Republic 0.2658 *** 0.0595 4.4700  
Moscow  0.3764 *** 0.1129 3.3300  
Moscow Oblast -0.1380 ** 0.0666 -2.0700  
Murmansk Oblast 0.0744  0.0765 0.9700  
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast -0.1660  0.0638 -2.6000  
Novgorod Oblast 0.0956  0.0651 1.4700  
Novosibirsk Oblast 0.2020 *** 0.0648 3.1200  
Omsk Oblast -0.6938 *** 0.0662 -10.4900  
Orenburg Oblast 0.1967 *** 0.0685 2.8700  
Oryol Oblast -0.0063  0.0611 -0.1000  
Penza Oblast -0.0754  0.0593 -1.2700  
Perm Krai -0.0529  0.0780 -0.6800  
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Primorsky Krai 0.3655 *** 0.0648 5.6400  
Pskov Oblast -0.2112 *** 0.0597 -3.5400  
Republic of Adygea -0.1038 * 0.0624 -1.6600  
Republic of Bashkortostan -0.1893 * 0.0661 -2.8600  
Republic of Buryatia 0.3023 *** 0.0617 4.9000  
Republic of Dagestan -0.1805 *** 0.0617 -2.9200  
Republic of Ingushetia 0.0615  0.0892 0.6900  
Republic of Kalmykia 0.4122 *** 0.0611 6.7400  
Republic of Karelia -0.1391 ** 0.0683 -2.0400  
Republic of Khakassia 0.1239 ** 0.0626 1.9800  
Republic of Mordovia 0.0938  0.0598 1.5700  
Republic of North Ossetia-Alania -0.4170 *** 0.0601 -6.9400  
Republic of Tatarstan -0.1842 ** 0.0742 -2.4800  
Rostov Oblast -0.2683 *** 0.0598 -4.4900  
Ryazan Oblast -0.0098  0.0611 -0.1600  
Saint Petersburg -0.2556 *** 0.0773 -3.3100  
Sakha (Yakutia) Republic 0.4326 *** 0.0952 4.5400  
Sakhalin Oblast 0.4416 *** 0.0945 4.6700  
Samara Oblast 0.0752  0.0730 1.0300  
Saratov Oblast 0.0913  0.0613 1.4900  
Smolensk Oblast -0.2387 *** 0.0605 -3.9400  
Stavropol Krai -0.0375  0.0594 -0.6300  
Sverdlovsk Oblast -0.2510 *** 0.0683 -3.6800  
Tambov Oblast -0.2860 *** 0.0598 -4.7800  
Tomsk Oblast -0.0098  0.0748 -0.1300  
Tula Oblast -0.3244 *** 0.0607 -5.3400  
Tuva Republic 0.3405 *** 0.0621 5.4800  
Tver Oblast -0.0211  0.0611 -0.3500  
Tyumen Oblast 0.4131 *** 0.1321 3.1300  
Udmurt Republic 0.0439  0.0639 0.6900  
Ulyanovsk Oblast 0.0204  0.0593 0.3400  
Vladimir Oblast 0.0632  0.0598 1.0600  
Volgograd Oblast -0.2702 *** 0.0618 -4.3700  
Vologda Oblast 0.0506  0.0780 0.6500  
Voronezh Oblast -0.0600  0.0598 -1.0000  
Yaroslavl Oblast -0.1762 ** 0.0659 -2.6700  
      
Year      
2001 -0.0636 *** 0.0209 -3.0400  
2002 -0.1617 *** 0.0221 -7.3100  
2003 -0.2521 *** 0.0239 -10.5700  
2004 -0.3114 *** 0.0273 -11.4100  
2005 -0.3818 *** 0.0307 -12.4500  
2006 -0.4432 *** 0.0362 -12.2400  
2007 -0.4756 *** 0.0413 -11.5200  
2008 -0.5120 *** 0.0450 -11.3700  
      
Number of observations 693     
Number of groups    77  
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Adjusted R-squared 0.9208     
Within R-squared    0.8770  
Between R-squared    1.0000  
Overall R-squared    0.9307  
F test (prob>F) 0.0000        
Breusch & Pagan test (prob>chi2)       0.0000  
    
Source: Author's estimation.      
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